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Effective preservation decision strategies. 
Jane Henderson and Robert Waller 
Introduction [Heading] 
This paper aims to advise conservators and others on how to recognise different modes of 
decision making. It does not seek to be a comprehensive treatise on decision making 
strategies. Rather, it aims to discuss and describe two types of mental processes involved in 
decision making: heuristic and analytic-deliberative, placing them in an appropriate context 
whilst identifying the limitations of each. The goal of introducing the concepts of decision 
making theory into the field is so they can be more thoroughly explored by people working 
on theory of and training for conservation. The intent in presenting this information is to 
increase within the fields of conservation theory and conservation education, awareness of 
the value of recognizing how these two types of thinking contribute both to decision making 
in general and to conservation decisions in particular. For simplicity of writing the term 
‘conservator’ is used in this paper to encompass all those working to understand, safeguard 
and enhance cultural heritage (UNESCO 1994). 
While not the primary goal of this paper it is also expected that conservation practitioners 
could use this paper to motivate reflection on ways their decisions are made and to identify 
instances where a change in how they think about decisions might be beneficial. 
Conservators may participate in decision making processes by contributing data or expert 
opinion to a group of opinion formers, or they may be involved in making their own 
decisions such as allocating their own resources. In many contexts the social rules for 
decision making may be fixed: being mindful of thought processes leading to the decision 
will be beneficial. 
Principles of decision making [heading] 
We make decisions, including professional decisions about preservation issues, both 
deliberatively and in real time. Deliberative decision making can be rational and provide 
essential guidance on long-term issues including requirements for preservation. These 
decision processes tend to be time intensive as they must be structured, evidence-based, 
and seek to be comprehensive. Within the preservation field there are exemplars of 
analytic-deliberative decision models such as the Cultural Property Risk Analysis Model 
(CPRAM) (Waller 2003, 2008a&b), which are being increasingly adopted in the heritage 
sector (Macedo and Waller 2011). In life, the vast majority of decisions are made 
instinctively, based on past experience and without insight into the process. If, in life, 
heuristics dominate decision making then those working to care for our cultural heritage do 
utilise heuristics whether they recognise it or not. Heuristic decisions may be made by 
recognising similarities with past situations and adapting behaviour: these decisions may 
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feel instinctive such as experiencing a sense of correctness when adjusting a display mount 
during the installation of an object. Our approach to decision making is always influenced 
and often defined by available resources, especially time. The decision making process can 
be either explicit or implicit (Baer and Snickars 2001, 278). This means that individuals will 
be aware that they are making decisions in some contexts more than in others. Modes of 
decision making are ‘a continuum, not a dichotomy’ (Kahneman 2003, 700), gaining insight 
into the decision making process will enable conservators to mindfully select and enact 
appropriate decision making strategies. 
When considering effective decision making, the ideal starting point is to examine and 
understand the problem or question that has instigated the process. Through clarity and 
insight into the problem a good decision making strategy can be selected: until you have a 
clear question you cannot expect a clear answer. Creating a good question is a significant 
challenge and many difficult decision processes stem from a lack of clarity at the outset.  
It is tempting to assess the quality of a decision making process by the desirability of the 
outcomes. Although it is true that a good decision process will often lead to a desired 
outcome, when dealing with situations that involve uncertainty, it is possible to make wise 
choices that end with a poor outcome, just as it is possible to make a decision on a weak 
basis (the toss of a coin) but latch onto a good outcome. It is important not to confuse the 
quality of the process with the desirability of the outcome.  
Definitions [sub heading]  
The fields of decision and risk analysis have established vocabularies of their own.  
Presented here is a summary of terminology used in this paper which, although common in 
psychology or risk analysis, is less familiar in conservation. 
Term Definition 
Analytic-deliberative 
process 
A combination of technical assessment and dialogue to foster 
stakeholder participation and involvement in risk management 
(Renn 1999). 
  
Attribute substitution Answering a difficult question by substituting an answer that  
comes more readily to mind ‘the essence of attribute 
substitution is that respondents offer a reasonable answer to a 
question that they have not been asked’ (Kahneman 2003, 
709). 
 
Broad framing Considering many variables in assessing a situation especially 
considering the longer term. Could be described as ‘seeing the 
bigger picture’ (Kahneman 2011). 
3 
 
Correspondence How well a model matches reality. 
Coherence Logical consistency of an argument. 
Cue A perceived prompt or signal that can guide choices. 
  
Decision perspectives: 
 
   descriptive  
 
How individuals or groups actually do make decisions (Edwards, 
et al 2007). 
   normative  How individuals or groups should make decisions to obtain the 
best expected result (Edwards, et al 2007). 
  prescriptive How actual, not idealised, people or groups should make 
decisions for the best expected results given realistic 
limitations on resources to make a decision (Edwards, et al 
2007).  
Experiential learning To learn through practical experience, ‘learning by doing’(Kolb 
1984). 
Heuristics Intuitive processes for arriving at decisions by considering only 
one or a few variables.  
Table 1. Terminology as used in the field of psychology, decision theory, and risk analysis. 
In the field of decision analysis, distinctions are made between normative, descriptive, and 
prescriptive theories of decision analysis (Edwards, et al 2007) to distinguish respectively 
between theoretically ideal, actually observed, and practically recommended forms of 
decision making. This distinction is important as it helps to engage the conservator in a 
process of reflection on their decision making. For example within the debates on 
environmental standards it is possible to organise a more honest debate by separating what 
is apparently desirable (normative) from what is actually happening (descriptive) and finally 
proposing pragmatic solutions (prescriptive) (Ashley-Smith 1994).  
Type 1 and Type 2 thinking [sub heading] 
There are many different strategies for decision making but for this paper we compare two 
forms of decision making. Naturalistic decision making (Klein 2009) is based largely on 
heuristic mental processes while the other form, analytic-deliberative decision making, 
relies heavily on reflective mental processes. These two kinds of thinking processes are 
defined within the dual-process theory of higher cognition (Evans and Stanovich 2013, 
Stanovich 1999, 2009; Kahneman 2011). Intuitive processes which are autonomous and do 
not require the use of working memory are described as Type 1 processes. Reflective 
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decisions making is described as Type 2 where the mind is engaged in hypothetical 
contemplation that requires the use of working memory. 
Within psychology the term heuristic is generally used to describe an intuitive, Type 1 
decision process. There is a variety of refinements on the term, for example Evans and 
Stanovich (2013) distinguish the defining features of heuristics from characteristics 
commonly associated with them. They describe the critical element of heuristics as being 
autonomous and not requiring the use of working memory.  
The term analytic-deliberative (AD) (Stern and Fineberg 1996; Renn 1999) is used in this 
paper to describe Type 2 thinking, a system of applying stakeholder judgements, including 
subjective value judgements, within a rational analytical framework to arrive at quantitative 
or semi-quantitative evaluations of risk. In some literature the simpler term ‘rational’ is used 
in this context. The authors have avoided this due to the implication that alternative 
decision making types are by definition non-rational as that term has a pejorative 
connotation. 
The dual process theory highlights significant contrasts and prompt questions about the 
divide between reported and actual decision making process. The authors believe that 
within the cultural heritage sector there are many benefits to be had from recognising 
heuristic decision making and accepting its appropriateness in many situations. They also 
suspect but cannot prove that the occurrence of heuristic decision making is under reported 
within the literature due to a discomfort in acknowledging the validity of the process. A 
failure to recognize the prevalence and validity of heuristic decision strategies could be 
impeding the ability of heritage professionals to improve quality in their decision making. 
Characteristics of type 1 and type 2 thinking are summarised in table 2. This table can be 
used as a summary of the strengths and weaknesses of each form of decision making by 
comparing their properties. The features are compiled from a series of publications and 
reflect an aggregation and some simplification of typical, contrasting characteristics 
associated with each of the two types of thinking in dual process theory. 
 
Type 1 Type 2 
Fast Slow 
Automatic, Instinctive Controlled 
Quick & Immediate Chosen 
Little effort Effortful 
Parallel Sequential 
Impressions and feelings Conscious reasoning 
Intuitive Reflective 
Implicit knowledge Explicit knowledge 
Pragmatic Logical 
Contextualized Abstract 
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Experience-based decision making Consequential decision making 
Simple Complex 
Frugal processing Data heavy 
Operates in uncertainty Reduces uncertainty 
Broad perspective  Focussed consideration 
Default approach Familiar in scientific conventions 
  
Table 2 Common characteristics of type 1 and type 2 thinking (Frankish and Evans 2009, 
Stanovich 2009, Kahneman 2011, Evans and Stanovich 2013). 
Goals [sub heading] 
Having established a clear definition of the problem then next critical act is to create well-
defined goals. If a goal is ill-defined it may be impossible to even characterise, much less, 
agree how to satisfy it. A feature of effective decision making strategies is to be clear on 
both the goals and sub goals of the project. The goal of a task in hand may be to carry out a 
survey to identify the highest priority collections for re-housing. Sub goals may be to carry 
out the project within budget and to be able to continue offering conservation support to an 
exhibition project whilst collecting that data. Clear goal setting at the outset creates 
conditions where decision makers (subject to valid feedback) can review experiences against 
defined, planned benefits and encourages a more honest assessment of the success of a 
project. 
Time spent defining the nature of goals is worthwhile and could inform all forms of decision 
making. Answering questions such as: is the goal to rank a set of options in order; is it to 
pick out a best course of action or is it to quantify options; would help identify a satisfactory  
decision making process. Quantifying options can really only be done using scales and data 
and must therefore be a data rich, analytic process whereas ranking options by stakeholder 
preference is potentially suitable for heuristic decision making. For example, the selection of 
a building for temporary storage of collections may involve quantification of a limited 
number of factors such as thermal insulation (a maximum U value) or on rental cost or may 
involve selection from among several available options based on convenience, and 
neighbourhood suitability in addition to more easily quantified factors.  
Attitude to Risk tolerance [sub heading] 
When considering preservation decision making it is useful to reflect on both personal 
attitude to risk and the approach to risk that an institution or situation encourages. Having 
more choices generally increases the incentive to experiment and may lower the perceived 
risk associated with the decision (Gigerenzer et al 1999 p351). A surfeit of choices can lead 
to decision paralysis and dissatisfaction (Schwartz 2004) but this degree of choice is seldom 
a problem in the museum sector. With interventive conservation treatments, conservators 
often have few options (indeed some of the best treatment stories arise from situations in 
which there appeared to be no option) whereas preventive conservators have more options 
and consultants even more. In general, hands-on conservators tend to think about items 
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individually and preventive conservators collectively. This collective view may encourage 
preventive conservators to consider problems in a wider context, which generally increases 
tolerance to any individual risk. Furthermore consultant (external) preventive conservators, 
being less constrained within a single institution’s self-perception, and having the 
perspectives of multiple operating contexts, might perceive more choices with consequent 
lower decision costs. Consequently it might be easier for them to broad frame the situation 
and take a more analytic and less emotional approach to risk. Indeed, systematic ignorance 
of details due to perspective distance has been suggested as a prerequisite for risk analysis 
(Merkelsen 2011). This view has been supported by risk analysis work by the authors in 
museums and archives where effort is required to help professionals with close ties to 
specific collections to let go of strong feelings about quantitatively small risks: to ignore, 
literally to become ignorant of, those feelings. 
In situations with perceived significant consequences it is useful to recognise that people 
have different emotional reactions to action and inaction. People may have a stronger 
reaction to an outcome produced by an action than inaction (comparable to sins of 
commission versus sins of omission) (Baron and Ritov 2004). The greater the consequences 
for the decision maker the more time they will spend and the more risk averse they are 
likely to be. Where a decision maker believes that the consequences of their decision will be 
scrutinised they will show a strong preference for inaction (Kahneman 2011 204). Where 
choices are restricted, consequences are high and scrutiny is likely there will be a strong 
pressure to being risk averse and to create a bias towards inaction.  An awareness of these 
pressures  prepares the conservator to recognise the possibility of a bias against active 
solutions (such as relaxing the humidity control settings then directing the consequent 
financial savings to improved storage cabinets) by identifying maintaining the status quo as 
a passive and inactive choice and as being only one of a set of options.  
Satisfaction [sub heading] 
Another factor to consider when studying preservation decision making is to consider what 
relative importance is placed upon outcomes being risk-quantitatively correct versus those 
outcomes being socially satisfactory in terms of how people experience their life. For some 
situations an outcome may be both correct and satisfactory but in others these may be 
different. For example, people often face situations where they know that taking the path 
that they feel they ought to follow could lead to conflict and unhappiness so they must 
choose between what they ‘ought’ to do and what would be ‘easier’ to do. Although 
deliberation may point to the more worthy ‘ought to’ option a recognition of the value of 
heuristics should encourage the decision makers to take their instinctive unease seriously.  
When making such evaluations in a professional context a decision maker should reflect on 
the outcomes required by critical stakeholders such as employers or trustees. The heuristic 
(type 1) unease can be recognised, prompting reflection (type 2), the outcome can be either 
one that which feels emotionally more satisfactory or one that can be more logically 
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defended, such outcomes may be the same or different. Being aware of and considering 
both types of cues may help a conservator to more clearly define and pursue their goals.   
Resources [sub heading] 
The choice of decision making strategy may ultimately be determined by the resources the 
decision maker is able to muster. Resources can include expertise, budget, time, availability 
and even the patience of the decision maker. An assessment of resource availability must be 
honest. Few people employed in collection care would consider they had little to do or a 
surplus budget that they cannot work out how to spend. The key is recognising when to rely 
on intuitive expertise and when, and how far, to take an analytic-deliberative approach. In 
some cases the assessment of resource availability may result in a commitment to seek 
additional resources to fund research and reduce uncertainty. In some cases, however, 
nothing can provide more time or money and resources must dictate the decision making 
strategy. It is also important to recognise those situations where additional resources and 
increasing sophistication in the decision making approach are not expected to improve 
decision quality or the utility of the outcome. For example, an initial response to a high 
humidity event resulting from a localised flood in a museum in a temperate zone could be to 
immediately ventilate the building within the limits of security. That enacted decision might 
only be moderated, if necessary, after a period of data collection.  
Decision making strategies [heading]  
Heuristic judgements [sub heading] 
Heuristics are quick intuitive mechanisms that everyone uses to make many of their daily 
decisions. Heuristics help people make decisions quickly, sometimes by substituting an easy 
to answer question for a trickier one. For example, if asked to rank the population of 
German cities a football fan may rank them in the order of the success and fame of their 
football teams (Gigerenzer et al 1999). Heuristics were necessary for the evolutionary 
success of humans and remain essential for functioning in today’s world. Although they are 
prone to predictable biases, many heuristics can operate on a par with structured analysis 
approaches and can, in some circumstances, result in more rational judgements (Gigerenzer 
1999 et al, Stanovich 2009, 2011).  
Heuristics are traditionally associated with a set of biases that can be recorded and 
described (Kahneman et al 1982). Bias in decision making tends to follow the availability of 
information. Recently discussed, interesting or alarming issues may play a bigger part in a 
person’s perception of risk (Ashley-Smith 1999, 19, Slovic 1987). Heuristic decisions have 
been shown to be better at dealing with frequency than probability. Heuristics have been 
shown to be effective at identifying preferable solutions from a set of options (Kahneman et 
al 1982, 164 and Gigerenzer, 2000). 
8 
 
Compound risks where a series of events must all happen for the consequences to arise are 
subject to well recorded bias. People have a tendency to over or underestimate the 
cumulative impact of risks depending on their assessment of the likelihood of the individual 
events (Kahneman et al 1982 p16). In preservation this may result in either over stating or 
ignoring the risk of a combined power failure, public holiday and high water level that could 
lead to a disaster. Ignoring compound small risks may be essential when decision making 
under pressure such as a disaster response but is ill-advised when time and resources 
permit, such as in emergency preparedness planning. 
Heuristic decision making avoids data rich analytical processes, opening up the potential for 
decision making based on a broad discussion of issues. This discussion offers the possibility 
of engaging a wide group of stakeholders on terms that they can relate and contribute to 
(Sloggett 2009).  Emotions and senses can feature in heuristic decision making, encouraging 
participants to consider the broadest context of a decision. As factors need not be 
quantified to be considered there is no limit to what can be included in the decision making 
process. In the best case, this can lead to transcendence of differences and the discovery of 
hitherto unforeseeable options and solutions to dilemmas. In the worst case, selective 
avoidance of evidence, and a lack of a structured model, will allow emotionally or politically 
charged options to be pursued despite strong empirical evidence of potential negative 
consequences. The opportunity for open ended engagement with a broad group of 
stakeholders to explore the big picture is a unique strength of the heuristic approach.  
Conservators engaged in shared decisions about preservation and use may approach a 
request to wear an item in the costume collection with a concern for the strength of the 
stitching or its vulnerability to staining. A user community may wish to establish whether an 
activity undertaken whilst wearing the garment is restricted by the size and construction of 
that garment. Allowing a broad and open discussion about all plausible benefits of the use 
proposed, before any efforts at quantifying costs and benefits may enable broad reframing 
and discovery of innovative solutions. If the activity has a positive impact on the significance 
of the collection as a whole then decision analysis from the perspective of the individual 
item may lead to a suboptimal decision from a collection, institution, or society perspective. 
Opening the discussion to explore all concepts without demanding their quantification can 
sometimes avoid unnecessary and unproductive material versus emotional polarisation. 
In contexts where heuristic decision making is acknowledged and embraced it is possible to 
identify common weaknesses. This allows the construction of strategies to counter those 
weaknesses. One such bias is hindsight bias: where people fail to learn from mistakes 
because memories of past experiences are re-configured by factoring in evidence that 
becomes available after the event. The inability to strip out recently acquired knowledge 
relates to the way that memory is constructed (Hertwig et al, 2003). A simple habit of 
keeping a desk diary or reflective log is a way to protect and learn from this. So, for 
example, most disaster response strategies should recognise the desirability of heuristic 
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decision making in the immediate response. However it may be hard in hindsight to 
appreciate the pressures on a manager deciding whether to enact the Emergency plan in 
response to a severe weather warning after that weather event has, or has not, occurred. 
Recognising that in an emergency, heuristics are desirable means that the predictable 
hindsight bias can be managed by good logging of the crisis management. Another common 
heuristic is for our minds to replace a difficult question with one that is simpler to answer, 
known in psychology as ‘attribute substitution’ (Kahneman 2011). In preventive 
conservation this has frequently manifested itself by replacing the question: ‘Is this gallery 
providing conditions in which my organic collection items will not be strained beyond their 
elastic limit due to fluctuating humidity?’ with, ‘Is this gallery at 55% ±5 RH?’. Defining goals 
carefully and setting them at the forefront of activities will help protect against bias. This 
can be as simple as ensuring that mission statements and project goals are restated at the 
start of discussions. Revisiting clearly stated goals during a project will also help diagnose 
whether the operation is successfully delivering on the goals or has descended into delivery 
of a procedure independent of goal achievement.  
Heuristics rely on using very few simple cues to make a decision, which means that some 
factors which could be considered are not used to make the decision (MacGilvray 2014).  
This strategy is not necessarily ineffective: for example lay people have been shown to be 
successful at investing in the stock market by creating a portfolio of companies based on 
name recognition alone with no examination of company performance or the track record 
of the CEO (Gigerenzer et al 1999). The speed and simplicity is the source of both the 
strengths and weaknesses of heuristics. They allow big picture decisions to be made quickly, 
perhaps gaining the benefits of a limited time opportunity and, by saving effort, they free 
the decision maker to concentrate on other tasks. An important factor to consider in 
evaluating the acceptability of a heuristic is its opportunity benefit and cost. That is 
considering the cost of the potential reduction in precision and decision transparency versus 
the gain of the alternative use of the decision maker’s time and attention. A conservation 
manager planning the relocation of part of a museum’s collection to an industrial store may 
simply exclude the option of including the fine art collections in the move, to avoid complex 
negotiations for the requirements of the building. The time saved might instead be better 
spent in discussion with colleagues to identify the specific requirements of the 
archaeological reserve collection (Gwilt 2008). 
The ability to select and evaluate one or two simple cues which work well to predict 
outcomes is another element of a successful heuristic decision. Research in psychology has 
found many such cues used effectively both in the natural world such as a rabbit’s 
recognition of predators or a bird’s strategy for feeding their chicks (Gigerenzer et al 1999, 
235, 311) and in human concerns, such a name recognition for financial investments or 
football success for population size. These simple cues have been shown to offer reliable, 
predictive relationships which can even result in more reliable outcomes than when some 
data is added to the decision making process (Gigerenzer et al 1999). Knowing if a cue is 
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useful is critical, for example, a schedule overrun on a construction project could be 
reasonably predictive as to whether there will be sufficient time left to safely install an 
exhibition but it may not be a useful predictor for the quality of the build. Reflection will 
help one decide whether using a simple question in place of another more complex one is 
effective. 
Heuristics, expertise and efficacy [sub heading] 
A trained conservator carries out a condition survey and spots a hint of salt subfluorescence 
forming in a terracotta figure. This single cue, coupled with knowledge of RH instability in 
the storage environment, suffices to automatically assign the item to the ‘needs 
conservation’ category without any further assessment of the surface soiling or fine cracks. 
A less experienced surveyor may not identify this critical cue and could continue to collect 
accurate but essentially superfluous data on cracks and dust layers perhaps even missing 
the key feature, subfluorescence. This example illustrates several points. Data on surface 
dirt and cracks is meaningful in describing the figure but despite its validity it has poor 
correspondence with preservation needs. If directed to look for signs of salts (i.e. directed to 
the critical cue) the novice could probably arrive at a coherent recommendation for its care. 
Making the expert write down the amount of dust and checking seven other condition 
boxes will do little to improve the usefulness of their assessment. The quality of the 
heuristic is therefore related to the ability of the assessor to identify key decision cues 
which, in this example, are indicators of risk.  
The value of instinctive and hard to quantify judgement is easy to recognise in conservation 
contexts. The feel of an organic material that has been humidified in order to manipulate it 
or the choice of tone for a gap fill can be recognised as excellent within the community of 
conservation practice. The best terms to describe how the outcome was achieved such as ‘it 
felt right’ reflect the intuitive qualities of heuristics at work, yet this description could 
appear to be a less developed form of thinking. The recognition and valuing of implicit 
knowledge, such as craft skill, helps the conservator to work with both hard data and 
expertise. Professionals may avoid acknowledging heuristics in public contexts as this may 
seem inappropriate in professional literature. In a formal paper it would be easier to state 
that a gap fill had a CIE measurement of XYZ and compared this to the CIE description of the 
original material, than it would be to say that the resulting fill had a satisfying neutral tone 
that was like the original but just a little more subdued. Yet most fills are chosen by their 
ability to satisfy client and conservator than they are by their instrumentally measureable 
condition. Any apparent preference to work with things that can be objectively measured 
(Hedley, 1993) or to ‘immerse themselves in the technical aspects of their work,’ (Ward 
1986, vii) may reflect less on the specific practice of conservation and more on the 
acceptable form of public discourse about conservation and science more generally. Hedley 
(1993, 152) argued that conservation decisions ‘are not matters that can be solved solely by 
reference to material facts’. It is because things such as ‘intuitive visual judgements’ with 
their associated aesthetics and emotions have validity in conservation that heuristics are an 
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essential part of the conservators decision making tool kit (Hedley 1993, 157). In a 
profession, such as conservation, where materials science underpins so much of the 
approach, developing a confident understanding of decision making and specifically a 
vocabulary to describe heuristic judgements should improve discourse and offer greater 
opportunities for reflective learning. 
Expert judgements arise from skills and knowledge that are learned well beyond the 
minimum needed for competency: they become intuitive, type 1, thinking. Consequently 
the expert will have limited insight into how their day to day decisions are reached. ‘An 
expert’s skill has become so much a part of him that he need be no more aware of it than he 
is of his own body’ (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986: 30). In situations with high consequences and 
where there is time for thinking before acting Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986, 32) argue that the 
experts do not turn to analytic-deliberative means for problem solving but instead reflect 
critically on their own intuitions and this understanding has been confirmed by more recent 
research on decision makers such as fire fighters (Klein 1999). Heuristics can be effective 
and accurate or they can be quick but inaccurate. Knowledge, experience and expertise can 
impact on which they are. Heuristics are, in all cases, the default means for making 
decisions. 
A conservator charged with the care of a furnished period house may notice on a rainy day 
that the visitor numbers are unusually high. Their intuition could signal this being an 
exceptional event with possible negative consequences. The conservator might decide to 
drop their task in hand and take action. Actions could be anything from restricting numbers 
visiting the most vulnerable rooms, changing the access routes or even to seeking 
monitoring data. The instinctive decision that action is needed is arises out of expertise 
based on years of experience and accrued knowledge. Even the decision to seek more data, 
although being an analytic-deliberative strategy, was triggered by a heuristic one.  
Uncertainty and heuristics [sub heading] 
Uncertainty is a feature of many museum operating contexts. For example ‘how will this 
fifteenth century table respond to a 15% drop in relative humidity level over an eight hour 
period?’ or ‘How much funding will we have in a decade’s time?’ are questions that 
conservators may consider. Whilst it is possible to predict the fade rate of a range of 
materials and pigments with increasing precision, it would rarely be possible to fully 
characterise all the materials included in a composite ‘found art’ piece. Much research work 
has been done to reduce uncertainty in conservation, most papers in this journal attempt to 
do just that but many questions remain unanswered. The world abounds in random 
variability, as well as knowledge deficiency, so uncertainty can never be entirely eliminated. 
Even in cases where (epistemological) uncertainty could be reduced by further fact finding, 
the time required for data collection may delay a decision beyond the time in which it could 
be usefully taken. By focussing decision processes on identifying and prioritizing meaningful 
cues, heuristics can provide answers in conditions of uncertainty without multiple options 
12 
 
needing to be scrutinised, evaluated, quantified and compared. The conservator responsible 
for the fifteenth century table could seek certainty that the table would be damaged, but in 
seeking certainty before acting the opportunity to prevent damage may be lost. 
Analytic-deliberative process [sub heading] 
Despite the prevalence of heuristics, in some situations people adopt the more cautious, 
detailed, but costly analytic process. The analytic process involves a systematic structuring 
and evaluation of knowledge and evidence by decomposing a question into component 
parts. Within limited, highly technical realms an analytic process can be designed and 
completed by an expert individual. For more complex issues, analytic-deliberative decision 
making provides a route whereby the expertise of the individual decision maker can be 
augmented by structured integration of external expertise. Deliberation allows multiple and 
diverse opinions as well as social values of multiple stakeholders to be expressed and 
considered. The analytic–deliberative process enables the meshing and interplay of the two 
processes. It enables data and evidence to inform opinions while allowing values to 
influence weights given to data. Many heritage organisations utilise cost benefit 
mechanisms to prioritise decisions or integrate concepts of significance with condition to 
plan the deployment of conservation budgets (Cassar 1998, Keene 1996).  
Analytic-deliberative, more than heuristic decision making, is the recognised form of 
decision making within scientific disciplines. There are many models for such decision 
making, including AHP (Saaty 1980), multi attribute utility theory (MAUT; Edwards and 
Winterfeldt 1987), multi-criteria decision analysis (Giove et al 2010), Bayesian reasoning 
(Darwiche 2009) cost-benefit analysis (Cassar 1998) and these are widely respected and 
utilised. Given the diversity of analytical decision making techniques this paper focusses on 
decisions for risk management to examine the application of analytic-deliberative decision 
making in a conservation context.  
Analytic – deliberative processes and cultural property risk analysis [sub 
heading] 
In planning preservation a well-structured and appropriate risk model is essential for 
efficient direction of resources (Waller 2002, 2008a). A comparable form of structured risk 
model for engineered systems has been described as a Hierarchical Holographic Modelling 
(HHM; Haimes 1998). A model of this kind can be used to establish a sense of completeness 
of risk accounting (Waller 2008b) which is critical for ensuring priorities are not based on a 
subset of actual risks that happens not to include the most serious risks.  The importance of 
a deliberate, well documented, and transparent approach to comprehensive risk 
identification has long been recognized within the risk analysis field (Kaplan and Garrick 
1981, Kaplan et al 2001). In conservation there remains a sense that this process can be 
rapidly achieved using ‘common sense’ (Michalski 2014). Misapprehension of the 
significance of risk scenario structuring can result in increased overall risk by diverting 
resources from more significant but non-assessed specific risks. 
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One of the greatest strengths of an analytic-deliberative decision making process is that it 
can focus evidence gathering effort where it is judged to have the greatest value for 
decision making. Collection risk assessments commonly demonstrate Pareto distributions to 
risks when profiled by generic risk (kind of hazard), by collection unit (part of collection), or 
other partitions useful for disaggregating risk (Waller 2008b). Pareto distributions reveal 
which factors are of dominant importance over others. These factors could be risks, parts of 
collections, locations within a museum, among others. Figure 1 shows an idealized Pareto 
distribution demonstrating how strongly a limited number of factors can dominate a 
quantity like risk and its distribution: a risk profile. In some contexts it is possible that an 
expert could readily heuristically identify the highest risks, for example collections held in 
challenging settings, such as an industrial warehouse or outdoor settings where a few risks 
are outstanding. In situations where the most egregious risks have already been mitigated a 
more formal process is likely to be required to identify the highest risks. It is also possible to 
rank the risks through a series of simple, heuristic judgements but this becomes more 
impractical the greater complexity of the context. 
Arguably the greatest importance of adopting an analytic–deliberative approach is enabling 
well-documented decisions to be made in situations where a lack of timely and meaningful 
feedback prohibits experiential learning. Most of the decisions made in support of 
preventive conservation do not lead to measurable effects within a context and timeframe 
that supports learning. For example a decision to house a collection in water resistant 
containers instead of thoroughly cataloguing the collection cannot be quantifiably studied 
by conducting a contrasting experiment with reversed priorities. Whereas both heuristic and 
analytic-deliberative decision process could lead to a decision to house the collection in 
water resistant containers, only analytic-deliberative would offer a fully argued account of 
the options considered and how each was evaluated. That documented accounting could be 
revisited after a significant passing of time which might contribute to learning. Given the 
difficulty of gaining feedback during conservation practice the ability to reflect and learn 
from the decision making of predecessors may ultimately be the greatest benefit of the 
process. Sadly, the lack of learning-enabling feedback within conservation may be poorly 
addressed and success could be measured by the delivery of the process rather than by 
reduction in damage. This would be an example of a poor cue substitution.  
Expertise and Feedback [heading] 
A critical feature of a decision making process is the degree to which the decision maker has 
truly relevant expertise. True expertise can be described as the ability to quickly recognize 
critical factors in a situation and choose the best option in the context (Klein 1999). 
Experience can lead to the development of effective heuristics which form a basis for expert 
decision making.  Experience without timely and meaningful feedback can lead to both false 
expertise and over confidence. In this case the repeated enactment of a common practice 
leads to stagnation and dogma perhaps bolstered by a false sense of expertise.  
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Heuristics operate with or without true expertise and superficially both expert and inexpert 
decision making processes appear similar. Expertise which has become intuitive offers little 
opportunity for insight as the expert simply knows that something is correct (Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus 1986). When questioned, the expert may not be able to describe how they know 
this. Still, the expert’s insight is fundamentally distinct from a novice’s guess. Although 
neither expert nor novice can offer an analysis of their decision making process one is quick, 
effective and accurate while the other relies on luck. It can be tempting to correlate 
expertise with experience however experience is no guarantee of the development of true 
expertise.  
Experience only leads to learning if a clear cause and effect link exists between action and 
consequences and it is possible to identify critical success factors (Shanteau 1992). Klein 
(1999: 104) argues that experts learn by deliberate practice where each opportunity for 
practice has a goal and evaluation criteria. By developing an experience bank and getting 
feedback that is accurate, diagnostic and timely we become experts. Without feedback, 
repetition, stable context, etc. experience may not lead to expertise. It is not having 
experiences that matters - it is what you learn from them (Shanteau 1992). Dorner (1996) 
provides a good description of the problem: 
“Methodism is likely to flourish in those situations that provide feedback on the 
consequences of our actions only rarely or only after a long time.  In particular, if our 
plans apply to a field in which we rarely act, our planning gradually degenerates into 
the application of ritual.”  
A lack of timely and clear feedback is a major challenge for preventive conservation and 
preservation management.  It can lead to methodism including, but not limited to, 
adherence to nominal standards beyond their limits of appropriateness. The continued 
disconnect between some sectors of the conservation field over environmental 
specifications (Atkinson 2014) is just one example of a tension of procedure over outcomes.  
Expertise is context dependent, it is only if experience and feedback are acquired in 
situations where critical success factors map well to the current situation that true expertise 
can be called on. A good correspondence of cues and outcomes is termed validity (Newell et 
al 2007).  
This definition of expertise could be problematic for conservation. In many cases the 
outcomes of conservation solutions are tested over decades and without controls, reducing 
opportunities for meaningful feedback. Where an action is repeated and verified, such as 
creating a repair in porcelain, expertise can be developed by the practitioner. Where the 
action is strategic, such as setting environmental control parameters it will require careful 
goal definition to enable the opportunity to measure and reflect on, at least interim, 
outcomes. The conclusion need not be to reject heuristics, but it may be that conservators 
responsible for strategic decisions could include in their continuous professional 
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development (CPD) allocating time to reflect on the quality of the feedback that they gain 
on their decisions.  
People invariably create stories to explain observations.  Low validity situations lead to false 
stories in which conclusions are not supported by evidence.  This is the source of most 
superstitions like having a lucky charm and ascribing good outcomes to its presence. The 
saying ‘a little knowledge is a dangerous thing’ reflects the danger of over interpreting the 
relevance of some cues without fully understanding the context.  Trying to apply specific 
items of knowledge without being aware of their place and limitations can lead to incorrect 
decisions and poor outcomes. Unfortunately, there is often little correlation between the 
confidence of a decision maker and validity. A declaration of high confidence tells you there 
is coherent story but not necessarily if it is true (Kahneman 2011). 
In some cases feedback can be obtained by sensitive measurement, for example, 
measurements of ΔE for fading colors. It would be hopeless to expect a conservator to 
develop a good judgment of relative fading rates for different moderately stable oil colors 
simply by walking through a gallery over the course of their career. In contrast, it is a 
relatively simple matter to instrumentally measure ΔE and combine this with light exposure 
data to calculate fading rates. It is also possible to conduct studies of the effects of 
preservation methods alternatives (Keene and Orton 1985). Still, these favourable situations 
for valid and timely feedback remain exceptions more than rules when considering the 
broad range of risks to cultural property. 
Comparison of heuristic and analytic-deliberative [heading] 
Having described heuristic and analytic-deliberative decision making it is beneficial to 
consider their use in a range of contexts. In particular, data requirements, including both 
quality and type are considered. The problem of illusion of accuracy is identified and 
discussed as are the interrelated issues of detail, focus and expertise.  Finally, situations 
appropriate to heuristic or analytic – deliberative approaches, or some combination, are 
described and specific cases examined. 
Data for decisions [sub heading] 
Data quality [sub heading] 
Where a choice between heuristic and deliberative decision making is available an 
important resource to evaluate is the nature of the data available? Is it sparse or 
comprehensive? Is it subjective or objective? Is it vague or precise? Is it clear what 
additional data is required and whether it can be collected? If new data can be collected it 
must be similarly scrutinised. The more abundant the data is, or has the potential to be, and 
the less uncertainty and subjectivity associated with it the more opportunities there are for 
number crunching traditionally associated with analytic-deliberative decision making.   
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The data that is, or could be, available should be examined for its coherence, its potential to 
predict an outcome. In making this evaluation a decision maker should ensure that the 
apparent coherence of the data has genuine and independent predictive value and is not 
simply correlated with the source (Kahneman et al 1982:65, Cox 2013). Knowing the goal for 
the research that created data can be helpful in evaluating the coherence of the data 
available to prediction of an outcome. Where data that is not coherent with an outcome is 
used it is unlikely to produce a useful outcome regardless of the form of decision making. 
For example, knowing the concentration of chloride ions in archaeological iron will help 
predict its stability and govern the frequency of silica gel changes. Equally, knowing that no-
one can remember the last time the silica gel was changed is a good prompt to go and 
change it. In these examples both analytic-deliberative and heuristic cues are likely to be 
coherent. By contrast choosing a strategy of changing gel on a schedule that is not 
correlated to air exchange of the boxes, or operating a habit of changing the gel in the boxes 
at the front of the store, would be poor decisions from either mode of decision making.  
Data type [sub heading] 
Some kinds of data are better handled with analytic-deliberative rather than heuristic 
processes, for example, probabilities, non-linear scales and decimals. Heuristic processes 
work more easily with frequencies, changes, and patterns (Gigerenzer 2000, Kahneman et 
al. 1982: 11, 164, Newell et al 2007: 102). 
People naturally think in terms of linear projections even though both natural and artificial 
systems often depict nonlinear behaviour, such as exponential growth or catastrophic 
decline (Meadows 2008). For example, a conservator might reasonably expect that doubling 
the exposure to light will double the rate of fading of fugitive colours. In contrast it might be 
quite wrong to expect that changing from an RH variability of +/-1%RH to +/-10%RH 
increases rate of deterioration or damage by a factor of 10. The real effect of that difference 
in RH variability could be insignificant, devastating, or anything in between. In the case of 
heuristic judgements, whatever scaling is used in reaching a decision is tacitly embedded in 
the decision and not (readily) available for critique. By contrast, in a deliberative model the 
scale for relating inputs to outcomes must be made explicit and is therefore available for 
review. In simple term a sportsperson can successfully catch a ball without being able to 
describe its speed or direction of travel. An aeroplane pilot who was unable to describe the 
flight speed or direction of travel would not be evaluated so positively, in both instances 
there is  best fit for decision making, each individually valid in context. 
Where numbers are described as fractions, especially small fractions, people have a 
tendency to see distinctions as irrelevant. For example, many people may not distinguish 
the difference between events with likelihoods of say 0.01, 0.00001, or 0.00000001 seeing 
them all as ‘tiny’ even though the expected value of the risks are one thousand or one 
million times smaller. With such precise absolute numbers heuristics may be ineffective, but 
if emotional decision are involved then communication of orders of magnitude may need to 
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be presented in a different way, for example describing small probabilities to patients in 
medical contexts can be managed by converting numeric data into visual data (Fuller et al 
2002).  
Perceptions, as other heuristics, are better attuned to differences rather than the evaluation 
of absolute magnitude. Whereas staff might not be able to estimate the actual temperature 
in their work area precisely, nor care, a change of just one degree Celsius could be readily 
perceived with extreme prejudice. Emotions are triggered by change (Kahneman 2003: 706). 
Whereas an analytical process would consider a change in value to be accurately described 
or characterized by its numerical value, heuristics convey how people experience a change 
in value according to context. This relates to the satisfactoriness of a change of state. 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). A shipping case containing a painting is accurately described 
by its weight and this would be an essential piece of data to collect and utilise, for example 
in planning suitable lifting equipment. The experience of the weight of the crate for an art 
handler will change over the time it is carried which may become a significant factor in 
assessing whether it is likely to be dropped.  
Heuristic and analytic-deliberative decision making processes have been identified as having 
strengths and weaknesses. It is evident that playing to a decision making strategy’s strength 
will increase the likelihood of good outcomes while aligning with weaknesses will increase 
the likelihood of poor outcomes. Further, being aware of which mode of decision making is 
being employed allows the user to operate appropriately, consistently, and mindfully. 
Making decisions using heuristics is instinctive and it may not be immediately apparent that 
a decision is being made, especially where the decision is to do nothing. Dangers that could 
arise from entrenched or ritualized decision processes include loss of meaning and an 
inability to note exceptions (for example reams of environmental records collected but not 
effectively acted on), post event rationalization (for example accepting deterioration as 
inherent vice rather than identifying and providing conditions necessary for preservation), 
or the illusion of objectivity. The heuristic decision to do nothing or to accept the status quo 
may not be recognised. Developing an ability to recognise heuristic decisions to take no 
action and the situations in which these are likely to occur, offers the conservator the 
opportunity to question the efficacy of such passive choices.  
Illusions of objectivity and accuracy [sub heading] 
Data can create illusions of power and objectivity. Consequently, decision makers should 
know or establish the limited relevance for any data they hold or plan to create. There are 
many advantages of careful analytic–deliberative decision making but these are lost when a 
rational house is built on irrational sand. This could occur if the model is incomplete, poorly 
structured or not populated with data. Can and will subjectivity be adequately controlled? If 
not then a heuristic or subjective decision might be substituted for the process with no 
decrease in validity but a significant reduction in effort.  
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The illusion of accuracy can also be problematic. The results of quantitative risk analyses can 
be reported as point estimates (single numbers) usually chosen to represent upper probable 
bounds, or similar, limiting value. Unfortunately, these numbers appear precise and convey 
an unwarranted sense of accuracy in both audiences for and users of the data. As a 
precaution against this, quantitative results can be expressed as distributions (Waller 2003). 
Unfortunately, these are often naively based on only uncertainty in variables and neglect 
the often much greater uncertainties in model structure and underlying assumptions. 
Hence, this apparent antidote to illusion of accuracy can exacerbate the problem. Precise 
data is like a sharp tool, it can be very effective but requires constant care in use to avoid 
harm through clumsy use. 
In planning for collection care, conservators are inevitably faced with uncertainty (Ashley-
Smith 2000). The way that a decision maker responds will be different for analytic-
deliberative or heuristic processes. A decision maker using analytic-deliberative techniques 
would ideally calculate the ‘value of information’ (VOI) to determine priorities for reducing 
uncertainty. VOI provides a measure of how much additional information could improve a 
decision by removing uncertainty. Heuristic decision makers may by-pass the lack of certainty 
by using modeling techniques such as attribution substitution, focussing on effective cue 
selection and prioritisation.  
People create stories as rationales to explain the data presented. Sometimes strikingly, 
when conflicting data is encountered people tend to retain their rationale and dismiss the 
data is as irrelevant (Kahneman et al 1982 p150, Tetlock 2005). This urge to seek and 
recognise only data that confirms a prior opinion is familiar to anyone that has scored 
options on a rational scheme and then decided that the outcome was ‘not right’ so the 
weighting scheme was re drawn to ‘get the right answer’. This was the case when the U.S. 
Army wanted to design a rational and transparent system to decide which collection 
repositories should receive artifacts recovered from military owned lands. To accomplish 
this, the Army Corp of Engineers designed a rational decision analysis approach supported 
by the analytical hierarchy process. Although museum experts contributed to the design of 
the system and made judgements to rank options, in the end the museum experts overrode 
some quantitative rankings with their intuitive senses of appropriateness (Department of 
Defense and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 1999). It would be inappropriate to judge this 
particular analytic-deliberative effort a failure simply because it did not quantitatively define 
an optimum answer. The system could not do that because political considerations were not 
included as quantified factors.  
Experts questioned on their decision methodology are often able to invent plausible 
descriptions of their decision making processes. However, as with the example of the 
revised ranking score this ‘explanation’ works back from the outcome and describes rather 
than predicts the process. It is a form of post event rationalisation. The danger is that a 
process which is apparently analytic-deliberative because lists and scores were used is, in 
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reality, a covert heuristic decision. This confusion is a worst of both worlds scenario, the 
time and effort is expended but the possibility for heuristic bias is neither acknowledged nor 
mitigated. Where an outcome arrived at by an analytic-deliberative process does not ‘seem 
right’ that sense should be recognised and prompt a re-calibration of the analytical 
technique, re-examining and re-visiting the underlying assumptions to uncover either where 
the analytic error resides or why the intuitive sense of ‘seem right’ is wrong. Either could be 
the case.  
Detail, focus and expertise [sub heading] 
There is a danger in detail. If every option is analysed then heuristics and associated biases 
can be avoided but at the risk of getting bogged down or lost in the detail. For an expert, 
involvement in detail can be a distraction, for the inexpert decision maker, as well as for 
experts with too many details to remember (such as pilots preparing for departure) then 
running through checklists is useful. Fortunately, both detail and overview can be 
accommodated through systematic, hierarchical structuring from a goal through to details 
(Waller 2002). 
As expertise grows the opportunity for effective and accurate heuristic decision making 
follows. A defining feature of experts is their ability to pick out critical cues: those elements 
of a complex situation which define the outcome. Once selected it is possible to evaluate 
these few cues in either a simple heuristic way or in a detailed data rich manner of classic 
rational decision making. This filtration process by experts can perhaps offer the best of 
both worlds, a quick and effective cue selection process followed by a detailed rational 
analysis of the much reduced and focussed pool of concerns and options. 
Uncertainty is inevitable. If the response to uncertainty is always further data gathering then 
the decision maker has entered an infinite loop. The ultimate decision making skill is 
knowing when and what data or evidence to seek and when to act despite uncertainty. 
Issue structuring, data collection and analysis are important features in the analytic-
deliberative process. For heuristics the emphasis lies more in cue selection and prioritisation 
(Kahneman et al 1982, Gigerenzer et al 1999, Martignon 2001, Newell 2007, Henderson 
2011). When an analytic-deliberative approach is adopted some considerations which do 
not translate easily into quantitative measures may be pushed aside. Needing to 
quantitatively evaluate a cue may exert a subtle pressure: encouraging decision makers to 
consider fewer variables or options and to focus their evaluation on cues which are most 
readily quantified. Some stakeholder’s concerns, such as intangible values or ethical 
concerns, may be hard to quantify and incorporate in an analytic-deliberative approach 
leading to soft issues being excluded from analysis (Sloggett 2009). Heuristics as a decision 
making strategy which focuses on evaluating cues can easily incorporate criteria which are 
difficult to quantify. 
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Outcomes derived from analytic-deliberative processes will appear to be more ‘correct’ than 
heuristic outcomes. This can provide a toe hold for a sanctimonious attitude on behalf of 
advocates for analytic-deliberative decision making. However, the accuracy of analytic 
results only hold in the context in which the problem was framed. Forgetting this limitation 
creates the possibility of applying findings beyond their relevancy. This skewed vision tends 
to prioritise technical issues over social or political ones. It is a well-recognised phenomenon 
in the risk analysis community where it is known as technocratic overreach. This may be the 
most insidious of the problems that can arise from application of analytic processes to 
preventive conservation decisions. 
In the case of heuristic decisions, the insidious danger, aside from the issues of biases 
discussed above, is a tendency to settle into habitual, even ritualistic, decision behaviours 
which can be not just non-productive but even counterproductive. Demanding that an 
archive collection most at risk from progressive chemical deterioration be maintained at 
50% RH instead of a lower value is a classic example of this problem (Pretzel 2005).  
Situations for heuristics or deliberative [sub heading] 
The context in which decisions must be made will influence which type of decision process is 
more appropriate. Significant factors include: must a decision be made rapidly; how 
repetitive are the decisions; can reliable rules be codified (either on paper or in the mind of 
the decision maker); how knowledgeable and experienced is the decision maker and how 
relevant is past experience to the current situation. These issues have been discussed above 
and are summarized in Table 3 for easy reference and comparison. For a simple decision, 
such as the location of an insect pest trap within a room then the method can either be 
heuristic when installed by a recognised pest expert, or analytic-deliberative if museum 
volunteers are brought in and are supplied with a checklist of ideal locations.  More 
complicated situations, such as creating the IPM strategy for a whole museum are likely to 
contain a series of decisions made using both strategies.   
Heuristic decisions maybe be effective  
when: 
Analytic-deliberative decisions may be 
when: 
Many repetitive, similar decisions must be 
made. 
The decision maker has good reason to be 
confident. 
Expert sense cannot be replaced by a 
technical measurement or combination of 
measurements. 
Factors best represented by intuitive 
knowledge are dominant or very important 
The consequence of an incorrect decision is 
high. 
The decision maker has insufficient relevant 
prior experience. 
There is little or no timely feedback on 
success of similar past decisions. 
Stakeholders must see that multiple factors 
are being considered jointly (transparency). 
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(e.g. human relations). 
Resources for decision making, including 
time, are necessarily limited. 
Creative outcomes are required. 
Sensory judgement required (e.g. feeling 
adhesion of a paint layer during removal 
with a scalpel). 
Factors best determined by technical 
measurements are dominant or very 
important (e.g., degree of polymerisation). 
Benefits of accountability justify resource 
use. 
 
Table 3. Guide to matching decision making process to context. 
Situations favouring a heuristic approach [sub heading] 
Heuristics are the default for decision making. Concerted effort is required to move to 
analytical thinking. This default setting has been shown to be evolutionarily valuable 
(Gigerenzer et al 1999) and when used by experts in appropriate contexts can deliver high 
quality outcomes with little effort. Heuristic approaches will be used in situations where 
time, cost and or sense of self efficacy in applying an analytical approach are limited. They 
may also be desirable in situations where broad social political factors play a dominant role.  
Studies show that people use different criteria to evaluate a choice if given a single option 
as opposed to a pair or more (Hsee et al; 1999). In a single option evaluation decision 
makers respond to qualities innate to the object, whereas with a range of choices 
measurable comparators are more likely to be evaluated analytically. When asked to 
evaluate a single showcase it might be described as having a metal frame and reinforced 
safety glass and containing a tray for silica gel. When asked to evaluate two cases the air 
exchange rate, cost and time till delivery are more likely to be considered as there is the 
possibility to create data useful comparisons. Where a decision relates to a single option or 
problem the heuristic, cue oriented, mechanism may be the most effective (Kahneman 
2011: 360) and an evaluation such as ‘is the metal frame a problem’ can address difficult to 
quantify issues such as design vision for the gallery.  
Situations favouring an analytic-deliberative approach [sub heading] 
Analytic-deliberative approaches are necessary when quantitative predictions must be 
made, when transparency of a decision process is required, and or where insufficient prior 
relevant experience exists. In high stakes decision making a deliberative process is likely to 
feel safer and is certain to be accountable. If a required decision outcome is a priority 
ordered presentation of options then an analytic-deliberative approach is required 
(Kahneman 2011 p415). This approach can be used to inform change, such as facility 
planning or policy development, but the goal and context must be sufficiently stable to 
ensure the decision outcomes can be generated within an acceptable time frame. Heuristic 
decision making has been shown to be vulnerable to predictable biases. Where these biases 
cannot be managed or avoided an analytic-deliberative approach may be the best option. 
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Whilst it may seem incredible that a large scale decision would be made based on heuristics, 
elements of the decision making process inevitably involve heuristics. This could be in a 
positive way such as aiming to raise a sense of civic pride via a building project. Or the 
heuristics may be involved in a disguised way such as using a significance framework to plan 
a large scale collection management project without recognition of the subjective, heuristic, 
elements with the mitigation of an ability to challenge or change the subjective elements 
over time. 
Working together [sub heading] 
Although it is possible to characterize decision strategies into heuristic and analytic-
deliberative processes and allocate them to specific contexts, in reality many situations 
require a combination of both types of thinking. Where decisions require consideration of 
both technological and social concerns it is likely that both forms of decision making will 
have their place. Some overtly simple optimisation strategies over simplify problems and 
other formal multicriteria decision making strategies can become overly complex and 
difficult to operate within social contexts (Hassler and Kohler 2000).  
At every step in a structured decision making process the value of seeking more information 
can and should be evaluated: both types of thinking offer value. Heuristics may be a useful 
precursor for considering and responding to broad factors prior to engaging in a more 
focussed analytic-deliberative process. Heuristics are also used to screen trivial details out of 
analysis. A ‘gut level’ check on the reasonableness of any analytic result would never be 
omitted by an experienced analyst as it provides a final means of catching egregious 
calculation errors. Further, on completion of an analytic-deliberative process the 
presentation and reception of the findings will be shaped by the heuristic assessments of 
the receivers. The analytic deliberative approach can only optimize within the bounds of 
rationally available options. If other, qualitatively different and quantitatively better options 
exist then they must be identified through an open minded, associative approach before 
they can be optimized through an analytic deliberative approach. 
Using Type 1 and Type 2 processes: case study CPRAM [sub heading] 
Having discussed the characteristics and applicability of heuristic and analytic decision 
processes in preventive conservation it is helpful to see how both processes are employed 
in conducting a comprehensive detailed risk assessment. 
Initially, a heuristic decision is made regarding whether or not detailed risk analysis using a 
comprehensive model such as CPRAM is appropriate in a given situation. Institutions 
exercising either very low or very high levels of collection care may not benefit from this 
approach. For example, if as a consultant conservator you find that half of a mixed historical 
collection is stored outside the museum building in a non-enclosed space then 
recommending a move of that material into a secure space with a reliable roof might be 
justified without need for more detailed analysis. 
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Once engaged in the CPRAM process, type 1 thinking processes are encouraged to facilitate 
the kind of open, associative, creative thinking that is required for comprehensive risk and 
collection values identification. This process has been termed ‘reasoned imagination’ (Paté-
Cornell 2012). Once a risk is identified, then alternating between type 1, open, and type 2, 
closed, analytical thinking is required to craft a definition of each specific risk that will be 
clear enough to allow quantification. In the next step, these well-defined specific risks are 
rank ordered by anticipated significance using a heuristic approach. In this case the validity 
of those heuristic judgments is ascertained by subsequent analytic–deliberative evaluation 
but the initial heuristic-based ranking remains an important part of the overall process. 
Any analytic-deliberative decision process will necessarily include some subjective elements, 
such as ‘value’ in a risk assessment. Even before a scale of relative value is considered one 
must choose either a single, unified sense of value or decompose the total value into 
categories of value. One example of a set of comprehensive categories of value is the four 
primary criteria listed in Significance 2.0 (Russell and Winkworth 2009). The decision to 
either decompose the total utility value into component kinds of value, or to rely on the 
curator to consider an integrated, heuristically judged sense of value is itself a heuristic 
decision. The choice requires careful consideration and depends on characteristics of both 
the situation and the personnel involved. Ideally all subjective judgements will, through 
deliberation, approach a consensus that, although not objective, is at least ‘collectively 
subjective’. If that cannot be achieved due to intractable individual differences then the 
necessary judgement must be dictated at the appropriate, higher hierarchical level. If 
judgements cannot be made robust in one of these ways then individual subjective 
elements influence, and could discredit, the analysis. Indeed any well-designed risk 
assessment model and process will facilitate rational validation of intuitive judgements 
before they are lost in the complexity of the decision process.  
Finally, after all the disciplined analytic–deliberative work is complete, it is important to 
ensure that results are presented in a manner that takes best advantage of the heuristics of 
the decision maker you are trying to influence. That means purposely connecting with their 
heuristic interpretations of information in ways that will result in the most favorable impact. 
For example, the CPRAM enables reporting of magnitudes of risk as ‘object equivalents lost’ 
which is a much more salient, hence influential, representation of risk than a small ratio of 
collection unit value lost. This is not a recommendation to change the results, but to 
consider how the results will be received. On a more strategic level it can be about 
connecting to the vocabulary and priorities of the key stakeholders, in current UK terms, this 
might involve describing conservation recommendations as increasing resilience and 
representing solutions in terms of the opportunity for community partnerships. This might 
increase the chance of success due to the current popularity of terms such as ‘resilience’ 
and ‘community partnerships’ within UK politics.      
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Using Type 1 and Type 2 processes: case study collection survey [sub heading] 
A scenario where both types of decision making can be imagined is a museum conservator 
considering a collection assessment. At the outset the conservator has a sense that they 
need to know their collection better to plan their conservation programme. This may be 
their first such project and they therefore do not have expertise. At this stage an analytic-
deliberative process of collecting and reviewing options is sensible. As there are many 
different ways to evaluate collections their applications must be evaluated. A full statistical 
survey (Keene 1996) can generate a list of priorities and allow staff to investigate much of 
the collection, however it will also generate a mass of detailed data on every type of 
collection.  A heuristic assessment might suggest it is improbable that they will get two new 
members of staff as a result of any assessment so collecting data to support such a request 
would be ineffective. The survey method can then be focussed either as a detailed survey of 
one part of the collection that has been heuristically assessed as being more likely to attract 
funding, or a different survey method chosen that identifies problems that may be solvable. 
The heuristic process helps with the formation of goals but an analytical deliberative process 
remains the best choice for data collection. The conservator then chooses a survey method 
which considers both collection need and value in order to show that actions can be 
prioritised as a combination of collection conditions and shared priorities (Xavier-Rowe et al 
2008, Taylor 2005). The method may be detailed analytic-deliberative and involve as many 
steps as possible to reduce inaccuracy, subjectivity and bias (Taylor 2013). Another heuristic 
decision can be used at this stage: if for example, the current museum director has 
prioritised building community partnerships then that less quantifiable cue can be included 
in the formation of the project goals. In order to create satisfaction with their manager the 
conservator proposes to invite community partners to participate in the assessment of value 
perhaps utilising social media. This manner of embracing the non-certain qualities of value 
may seem less defendable in empirical terms than creating formal scales based on ‘expert’ 
judgement but may have significant benefits if resulting satisfaction levels are high.   The 
consequent process collects the best possible data to a defined end together with an 
awareness of a context and other people’s priorities that is most likely to lead to satisfactory 
outcomes. 
Summary [heading] 
So what is the appropriate way to make decisions? There is no simple answer. Some things 
can be stated with certainty. Portraying subjective data as objective is disingenuous and 
ineffective. If one has not faced similar problems in the past there is no expertise so it is 
likely that any heuristic decision will be strongly biased and possibly irrational. In this 
circumstance rational and competent behaviour has to be the default option (Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus 1986 p36). Many environments favour heuristics, especially those where decisions 
are repetitive, or where social factors have high importance and where resources are 
restricted. If and as opportunities arise these decision processes can be improved by 
reflective analysis and deliberation.  Some environments favour analytic-deliberative 
25 
 
decisions, especially unique situations with high consequences. Those decisions can be 
improved if they respect the power and importance of heuristic processes in establishing 
judgements and in effectively communicating with higher level decision makers. Although 
the choice of decision making strategy is not always a conscious one this paper has sought 
to demonstrate that the ultimate goal is to be able to employ decision making strategies in 
their optimal context to achieve the best possible outcomes. 
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Figure caption 
Figure 1. Idealized Pareto distribution. Columns represent magnitudes of individual risks. The curved 
line represents a cumulative total magnitude of risk. © Protect Heritage Corp. 
 
